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ESSAYS
MISSING THE "PLAY OF INTELLIGENCE"
DANIEL A. FARBER*

Something is awry in current academic and judicial writing
about law. In a recent article, Judge Harry Edwards complained
that the writings of professors are no longer relevant to the
problems faced by the profession.' This complaint deserves to be
taken especially seriously because Edwards is not only a judge
on the D.C. Circuit but a former professor of labor law at the
University of Michigan.2 On the other hand, the complaints run
in the opposite direction as well. Professors complain that Supreme Court opinions' are increasingly arid, formalistic, and
lacking in intellectual value. Here, I am not speaking merely of
interdisciplinary scholars who might be expected to find conventional judicial opinions uncongenial. Rather, this dissatisfaction
with current judicial opinions seems equally widespread among
old-fashioned doctrinal scholars-and not just those with ideological axes to grind. Perhaps these criticisms are overblown, but

* Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. This Essay was
delivered as the Wythe Lecture at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law at the College
of William and Mary on February 17, 1994. I would like to thank Jim Chen, Dianne
Farber, Phil Frickey, Vic Kramer, Suzanna Sherry, and Martin Sweet for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts. The influence of my late colleague Irving Younger on this Essay will also be apparent. I also wish to thank the faculty and students of William and Mary for their cordial hospitality.
1. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992).
2. Judge Edwards also documents a perception by legal scholars themselves that
their work is becoming removed from the intellectual needs of practitioners. See, e.g.,
id. at 50 (noting concerns of Richard Posner regarding decline in doctrinal scholarship); id. at 75-76 (noting George Priest's prediction of an increasing gap between
law professors and the bar).
3. For better or worse, Supreme Court opinions are the most frequently read by
academics.
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there is enough truth in both sets of complaints for genuine
concern. However, identifying the missing element in current
legal discourse is not easy.
For me, this missing element is best captured by the phrase,
"the play of intelligence."4 Although the meaning of this phrase
will be discussed later in this Essay,5 a research mishap during
the writing of the Essay provides a suggestive analogy. A Nexis
search for "play" within two words before "intelligence" identified numerous sports stories to the effect that some athlete
"played with intelligence." The import of this description was
that the athlete's performance was not programmed. Instead,
the athlete responded quickly and creatively to the twists and
turns of the game, showing an imaginative sense of the possible
future actions of the other players, and also showing a keen
awareness of the overall strategic position of the game. These
traits are not specifically athletic. They could be displayed just
as clearly in a game of bridge or chess, by a lawyer during a trial, or by an appellate judge or legal scholar. Roughly speaking,
it is these traits that seem lacking in so much of what appears
in law reviews and West reporters.
The remainder of this Essay will explore these issues in greater depth. Part I considers the flaws in much of the Supreme
Court's current work product. Part II somewhat more briefly
considers the subject of legal scholarship. Finally, Part III will
try to clarify the concept of the "play of intelligence" and will
consider how we can begin to reclaim it.'

4. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 88-90.
6. The focus of this Essay will be on diagnosis and possible cure rather than
causation, but some brief comments on the latter topic are in order. First, weaknesses in the writing of academics and judges are linked: Weak academic writing provides less assistance to judges, and weak judicial writing is less likely to spark
scholarly insights. Second, it is tempting to blame law clerks for the weaknesses of
judicial writing, but this explanation does not account for the further weakening of
legal writing in the last few years (nor does a similar theory absolve academics who
do more of their own writing). Third, part of the explanation probably lies in the
increase in ideological polarization, which distorts the selection process in both settings and also may lead to increasingly hostile and unproductive exchanges both on
the bench and in the academy. See infra text accompanying note 102.
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I. JUDICIAL OPINIONS

Morton Horwitz, the distinguished legal historian, wrote the
Foreword to a recent annual review of the Supreme Court by the
Harvard Law Review.' He dutifully studied the Court's output
from the previous Term. As someone whose work has focused
primarily on earlier eras of the judicial history, he was dismayed
by what he found in the current advance sheets. "[T]he current
Court's jurisprudence," he concluded, has "devolved into conceptualism and technicality."' Rather than vision, he found a "thick
undergrowth of technicality":
With three or four "prong" tests everywhere and for everything; with an almost medieval earnestness about classifica-

tion and categorization; with a theological attachment to the
determinate power of various "levels of scrutiny"; with amazingly fine distinctions that produce multiple opinions, designated in Parts, sub-parts, and sub-sub-parts, this is a Court
whose Justices appear caught in the throes of various methodological obsessions.'
A footnote wryly observes that "[a]fter devoting quite a bit of
time just to reading the endless concurrences and dissents in
any important case, one then is faced with the olympian task of
trying to determine whether there is an actual majority behind
any proposition."' °
This criticism is a bit harsh but has a core of truth. Lest
Horwitz's comments be dismissed on the basis of his association
with Critical Legal Studies, Robert Nagel, a perceptive conservative commentator, has put forth many of the same criticisms."
Nagel aptly describes the Court's style as a combination of the
bureaucratic and the academic:

7. Morton J, Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV.
30 (1993).
8. Id. at 98.
9. Id. at 98-99 (footnotes omitted).
10. Id. at 99 n.333.
11. See Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165, 17779 (1985). In the nine years since this article appeared, the characteristics of Supreme Court opinions described by Nagel have become accentuated.
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Although the Court's formulae are not as long or involved
as many administrative rules and guidelines, some of the
same characteristics are plainly evident. Both are complex,
layered, and equivocal. Both employ words in a puzzlingly
artificial way ....

Typically both attempt to cover all contin-

gencies.... In both an air of authority is established by
illusory precision....
The formulaic style is not, however, fully or only bureaucratic. It is also academic. The opinions look like law review
articles. They have the same pattern of laborious footnoting
and detailed argumentation. They have the same formalized
organization-introductions, major divisions, subdivisions,
conclusions....

One reason the formulaic style is little no-

ticed by commentators is that it so resembles the voice of the
academy.12

Based on conversations with scholars at my own and other
law schools, a good many centrists also agree with this characterization. In speaking with other professors, and even with
journalists, I have found a surprising consensus that the Supreme Court's opinions (especially those of the last five years)
simply are not very interesting anymore. Bluntly, much of what
the Court produces these days lacks the qualities of good legal
writing.
Horwitz and Nagel focus on major constitutional cases, but in
some ways, run-of-the-mill cases are more revealing of judicial
quality. Consequently, I will use three routine statutory cases as
illustrations. Each one of the following statutory cases presented
a narrow, but interesting legal issue:
1. United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co. 3 (The firearms case). A federal law levied a tax on a manufacturer for
each short-barreled rifle sold." A manufacturer sold pistols together with a kit that allowed them to be turned into short-bar16
reled rifles. 5 Was the manufacturer covered by the statute?
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
112
Id.
Id.
See

S. Ct. 2102 (1992).
at 2104.
at 2105.
id.
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2. United States National Bank of Oregon v. Independent
Insurance Agents of America, Inc. 7 (The banking case). Due to
an error by the revisers, a minor provision regulating national
banks was apparently repealed by accident during a recodification in 1918.18 Nevertheless, life went on as usual, with the
industry and the regulators acting pretty much as if the statute
were still in effect.' 9 In fact, in 1987 Congress passed a minor
amendment to this statute." Finally, in 1992, in a case where
the issue had not been raised by any of the parties, the D.C.
Circuit astounded everyone by announcing that the statute had
not been in effect for decades. 2 ' Did the statute still survive?2
3. Chapman v. United States2" (The LSD case). Both a federal statute and a sentencing guideline imposed harsh mandatory
penalties on someone who sold either drugs or a "mixture" containing drugs over a certain weight.2 4 In the case of LSD, the
drug itself weighs almost nothing.2 5 The prosecutor argued that
the weight of the blotting paper used to contain the drug should
count.2 6 If so, the defendant's sentence depended less on the
amount of drug sold than on how the blotting paper had been
cut.2 Should the weight of the paper have been the basis of
sentencing?2 8
Admittedly, these cases are not blockbusters, but they raise
intriguing (if narrow) issues. Nevertheless, the Court found
nothing interesting to say about any of them. For example, here
is a central paragraph in the Court's explanation of its holding
in the banking case:

17. 113 S. Ct. 2173 (1993).
18. Id. at 2177.
19. Id. at 2176.
20. Id.
21. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Clarke, 955 F.2d 731, 732 (D.C. Cir.
1992), rev'd sub nom., United States Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Independent Ins. Agents of
Am., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2173 (1993).
22. See United States Nat'l Bank of Or., 113 S. Ct. at 2177.
23. 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
24. Id. at 455-56.
25. See id. at 457.
26. See id. at 456.
27. Id. at 459.
28. See id. at 456.
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The first thing to notice, we think, is the 1916 Act's structure. The Act begins by stating t]hat the Act entitled "Federal Reserve Act," approved [1913], be, and is hereby amended
as follows. 39 Stat. 752. It then contains what appear to be
seven directory phrases not surrounded by quotation marks,
each of which is followed by one or more paragraphs within
opening and closing quotation marks. These are the seven
phrases (the numbers and citations in brackets are ours) [this
is followed by a full half-page verbatim quotation. Then the
Court continues:]
The paragraph eventually codified as 12 U.S.C. § 92 is one
of several inside the quotation marks that open after the
third phrase, which "hereby amended" Rev. Stat. § 5202, and
that close before the fourth, and the argument that the 1916
Act placed section 92 in Rev. Stat. § 5202 hinges on the assumption that the third phrase is a directory phrase like each
of the others.29
The tone of this passage is unhappily reminiscent of a software
manual or the inscrutable instructions accompanying an IRS tax
form. The Court continued with this labored grammatical dissection of the statute at some length" before triumphantly announcing that the case was so clear that neither legislative history nor the administrative construction of the statute could be
considered. 1
The other two cases produced equally dull opinions. The deciding votes in the firearms case were cast by Justices Scalia and
Thomas, who said only that selling a rifle kit is different than
producing a rifle,3 2 while the plurality made a muddled distinction between single-purpose and dual-purpose kits.3 In the
LSD case, the Court's analysis basically came down to quoting
two dictionary definitions of "mixture" and steadfastly refusing

29. United States Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 113
S. Ct. 2173, 2183 (1993).
30. See id. at 2183-86.
31. Id. at 2186 n.11.
32. See United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 112 S. Ct. 2102, 2110 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 2107-10.
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to think seriously about anything else. 4
Perhaps, one might surmise, there was nothing more interesting to say in these minor cases. In this respect, it is revealing to
compare the rather stodgy Supreme Court opinion in the LSD
case with Judge Posner's dissent in the court of appeals. 5 Here
is Posner's explanation of the flaws in the government's approach to sentencing:
[A] quart of orange juice containing one dose of LSD is not
more, in any relevant sense, than a pint of juice containing
the same one dose, and it would be loony to punish the purveyor of the quart more heavily than the purveyor of the
pint. It would be like basing the punishment for selling cocaine on the combined weight of the cocaine and of the vehicle (plane, boat, automobile, or whatever) used to transport it
or the syringe used to inject it or the pipe used to smoke it.36
Indeed, Posner commented, a person selling one dose of LSD in
a glass of orange juice could obtain a heavier sentence than one
who sold 180,000 doses in pure form." '"Well," Posner asked a
bit later, "what if anything can we judges do about this
mess?"38 The answer, he said, depends on whether judges have
authority "to enrich positive law with the moral values and
practical concerns of civilized society."39 Posner's discussion has
a vigor and intellectual excitement that is missing from the
Supreme Court's opinions in all three cases.
Perhaps the oddest aspect of many of the Court's decisions is
that the Justices seem to have lost sight of any purpose in what
they are writing.4" Let me catalogue some of the problems in

34. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 462 (1991).
35. United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1331 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(Posner, J., dissenting), affd sub nom. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453
(1991).
36. Id. at 1332.
37. See id.
38. Id. at 1334.
39. Id. at 1335.
40. The Court seemingly views the issuance of opinions to be an end in itself, as
if the text of the opinion had some autonomous value unrelated to its ability to
communicate to an audience. At a deeper level, the intellectual flaw in the statutory-interpretation opinions is similar. The Court often treats statutes as ftee-standing
texts, with little attention to their historical and social contexts or what their
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the Court's work product.
The first problem is a tendency to prove laboriously the obvious. The Court sometimes seems incapable of stating the most
basic legal proposition without a supporting bevy of citations.
For example, it is not enough to begin analyzing a statutory
issue by looking at the statutory language. The Court has to
explicitly tell us that the statute is the place to start and then
give a couple of citations to that effect. The Court decides a good
many statutory cases and continually feels obligated to supply
authority for this proposition,41 as if the Justices were afraid
that the audience would otherwise disbelieve them.
Even worse than proving the obvious is the labored exploration of material that, in the end, turns out to lead nowhere. The
Court regularly explores the legislative history in numbing
depth, only to find it inconclusive or at least too weak to justify
departing from the text.42 The average lawyer presumably
would be willing*to trust the Justices if they simply reported
that they had checked the legislative history and found it wanting.
The Court's handling of the factual record is also often unproductive. The Court often begins an opinion with a lengthy review of the history leading up to the lawsuit, the procedural
development of the case, and so forth.43 Often, much of this
background lacks any legal relevance. After announcing a legal
standard, the Court then devotes more pages applying that stan-

drafters were trying to achieve.
41. See, e.g., John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 114
S. Ct. 517, 523 (1993); Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 237 (1990); Mallard
v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 300-01 (1989); United States v. Ron Pair
Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989).
42. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe and Prod. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 113 S. Ct. 2264, 2282 (1993); United States v. Thompson/Center Arms
Co., 112 S. Ct. 2102, 2109 (1992); United States v. American College of Physicians,
475 U.S. 834, 846 (1986).
43. See, e.g., Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1077-80 (1993) (detailing all of
the plaintiffs' allegations, the parties' stipulations, interlocutory action taken by the
legislature, committee and panel proceedings, and so on); Parke v. Raley, 113 S. Ct.
517, 519-21 (1992) (outlining in laborious detail the procedural history of the case,
including hearings, plea bargains, and motions); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33,
37-45 (1990) (devoting the first eight pages of a desegregation ruling to minutiae
about the procedural development and factual background).
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dard to the facts. If done in a cogent, crisp fashion, this analysis
could provide guidance for lower courts in future cases, but often
the Court feels obliged to explore the facts in tedious detail-so
tedious that one wonders if the issue should not have been left
to the lower courts or perhaps even the jury. For example, in a
recent antitrust case, the Court spent many hundreds of words
showing that a particular cigarette company was not guilty of
price discrimination or predatory pricing during a certain time
period." Apart from possibly usurping the fact-finding function
of the jury, this discussion seems unlikely to add to the development of the law.
When the Court does attempt to guide lower courts, it generally uses multiprong tests that sometimes fail to provide much
illumination. As Professor Horwitz says, the Court takes these
tests very seriously indeed.4" For example, lower court judges
may find themselves reproved for considering a fact under prong
three of the test for regulating commercial speech, when the fact
should have been considered under prong four.46 Sometimes
these tests can provide future guidance, but often they have
limited practical utility.
An apt example is provided by the public forum doctrine.4
This doctrine divides public property into traditional public
forums, limited public forums, and nonpublic forums-providing
a separate test for each one.4" There also seems to be at least
one additional category for government-sponsored speech. I have
criticized this test in previous scholarship,4 9 but my real complaint is in my role as an administrator. Questions arise about
speech activities at the law school-students wearing offensive

44. See Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578
(1993).
45. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
46. See United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2704 (1993).
47. For the details of this doctrine, see, for example, Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983), regarding restrictions on the use
of a school system's in-house mail system and corresponding free speech orotections.
48. Id. For another example, see Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507,
519 (1991) (using a difficult-to-apply test of "germaneness" for union dues).
49. Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum
Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV.
1219 (1984).

156

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:147

T-shirts in the hall, posting placards in the foyer, attaching
notices to bulletin boards, setting up tables in the hallways,
engaging in fund-raising, or inviting speakers. Not infrequently,
these activities are controversial and lead to requests for an administrative response. In responding to these very routine situations, I have to apply the public forum test, but often find it
impossible to obtain relevant information, such as the exact
history of previous uses of the same location or activity or written rules covering them. Surely, the Court could give more useful guidance to those of us who are trying to obey the law."
One reason that the Court's tests can be unhelpful is that
they are often based on rather fine, if not insubstantial, distinctions. In the St. Paul cross-burning case,51 Justices Scalia and
Stevens debated a far-fetched hypothetical: Would St. Paul's
ordinance apply equally where an advocate of tolerance uses
fighting words that insult a bigot on the basis of his intolerance,
and the bigot then responds with fighting words insulting the
concept of toleration? If not, Scalia argued, the ordinance discriminates in favor of the viewpoint of the tolerant." This analysis seems reminiscent of the Rule Against Perpetuities, where
trusts were struck down not because of anything that might be
reasonably likely to happen, but rather because of some hypothetical involving a ninety-year-old woman giving birth or someday marrying a person as yet unborn. To take a more mundane
example, Justice Scalia also wrote a bankruptcy opinion in
which the outcome of the case turned on whether a lien vested
at the precise instant that a property interest was created, or a
nanosecond later.5" In both cases, if he had stepped back and

50. Notice, I am not even complaining that the test gives the wrong answers;
rather, it does not give me useful answers at all. In some of these situations, if the
speaker is not protected by the First Amendment, I may have a legal duty to intervene under the civil rights laws in order to prevent a hostile working or educational
environment. The Court has been equally unhelpful in defining that test as well.
This absence of clear direction from the Court leaves me in something of a quandary
as a conscientious administrator trying to obey the law.
51. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
52. Id. at 2548.
53. Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 314 (1991). For a devastating critique, see C.
Robert Morris, Bankruptcy Fantasy: The Site of Missing Words and the Order of
Illusory Events, 45 ARK. L. REV. 265 (1992).
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gotten some perspective on what he was doing, Justice Scalia
might well have rested less heavily on such metaphysical distinctions.
This critique of the Court's work product should not be exaggerated. The Justices are hard-working, capable lawyers, facing
very difficult problems that often arise in technical and unfamiliar fields. Opinions can be long because cases are complicated;
courts can fracture because issues are recondite. Yet it seems
fair to say that the overall written performance is uninspiring.
Frequently, opinions today almost seem designed to wear the
reader into submission as much as actually to persuade.
On one level, these problems merely involve matters of writing style. Nonetheless, they seem to reflect a failure by the Justices to think about their audience and their goals. Instead, the
Justices seemingly grind out written products without any real
consciousness of purpose. Even when, as in much of Justice
Scalia's work, the product avoids dullness, it nevertheless fails
to persuade. Rather, Scalia often preaches with brilliant
flourishes to the converted, impressing his followers at the Federalist Society but doing little to petsuade the neutral reader
and often unnecessarily alienating potential allies on the Court.
Much of the problem seems to be a lack of perspective. If a
Justice stopped to think about what he or she was doing and
why, the result might be to rethink how the opinion was writ-

ten. Unlike the hypothetical athlete who "plays with intelligence," the authors of many of these opinions seem to lack a

sense of the flow of the game that they are playing. They also
seem to forget that the point of the game is not elaborate drib-

bling but scoring baskets.
The Court's failure to write more persuasively is unfortunate

for more than stylistic reasons. We expect the Court not only to
solve legal problems, but to explain why important issues should
be resolved one way rather than the other. Even in the relatively minor cases discussed earlier, the decision is important to not
only the parties, but many others. How many casual sellers of
LSD, one wonders, will face draconian mandatory sentences only

because they used too large a piece of blotting paper?54 They
54. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
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have a right-and we as a society have the right-to a persuasive explanation for this result. Similarly, with the question of
whether short-barreled rifle kits should be freely sold55 or even
what markets are open to national banks," we are entitled to a
persuasive explanation. The kinds of bureaucratic documents
produced all too often by the Court simply do not exhibit an
adequate understanding of a significant societal decision. Consequently, these opinions also do little to contribute to our national dialogues over public policy. 7
II. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
It is not hard to frame a similar indictment of the state of
current law review writing. For example, in an article in the
Harvard Law Review a few years ago, Kenneth Lasson said:
It may be hard to say whether good writers are born or
made, but it's painfully obvious that few of them are legal
scholars. Law review prose is predominantly bleak and turgid....
Similarly, length remains a hallmark of erudition. "[L]et
your words be few," said Solomon himself, but the legal scholars continue to exalt quantity.5 8
Providing documentation in support of this indictment is unnecessary; few readers of law reviews will disagree with the general
import of Lasson's criticisms, though some may find his language too harsh.
Another worrisome concern relates less to stylistic weaknesses
than to the intellectual aridity of much legal discussion, even on
issues of pressing public concern. Worse yet, some indications
exist that we are approaching the point where discussion of the
issues may tend to dissolve into exchanges of ad hominem insults.

55. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
57. To take as an example an area in which I teach and write, although the
Supreme Court has written many opinions in environmental law, in my view, this
jurisprudence has had little real impact on environmental law.
58. Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REV. 926, 942 (1990).
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Here, even more than in the discussion of the Supreme Court,
I can do little more than provide some suggestive illustrations.
Given the volume of writing by legal academics, it would be
impossible to give an adequate number of examples. I will discuss only a small subset of the literature devoted to subjects of
major social concern. I will focus my remarks on scholarship
relating to affirmative action, with a passing look at one small
aspect of the debate about pornography. Even within these two
areas, there are certainly exceptions to my somewhat gloomy
assessment of the scholarship, so my comments should be taken
only as crude generalizations.
I spent a good deal of time in the last year reading legal scholarship about race in general and affirmative action in particular.5 9 It was a somewhat depressing experience. We seem to
have worn deep grooves repeating the same basic arguments
and counter arguments over and over.
The basic arguments on affirmative action are fairly easy to
lay out. They can be found, for example, in the opinions in the
Bakke case" over fifteen years ago. The argument against affirmative action goes like this:
Whether you call them affirmative action or reverse discrimination, racial preferences are wrong. They are morally
wrong whichever group is favored. They are also dangerous,
because they reinforce the legitimacy of racial thinking and
racial stereotypes. Race is simply an irrelevantpersonal characteristic.

Here is the counterargument:
Color-blindness sounds good in theory but ignores social
reality. Given a history going back to slavery, and the
prevalence, even today, of conscious and unconscious discrimination, affirmative action is a necessity. It also ensures that
the full diversity of viewpoints in our multiculturalsociety is
represented.

My quarrel is not with these arguments, but with the fact that

59. This research was directed toward a forthcoming article, Daniel A. Farber, The
Outmoded Debate Over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 1994).
60. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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we have heard them so many times before and are apparently
doomed to hear them repeatedly in the future.
Besides being repetitive, the arguments tend to be quite stylized. We tend not to notice this stylization just because we are
so accustomed to the almost ritualized formulae. One aspect of
these arguments that I find particularly striking, for example, is
that almost all of the affirmative action debate relates to African
Americans. Indeed, even members of racial minorities themselves tend to speak either of blacks or of "people of color" collectively, as if all minority groups were fungible. This characterization has never been true and is rapidly becoming completely
unrealistic.
Someone who read only law review articles in major law reviews would be surprised to learn that Mexican Americans are
about to supplant African Americans as the largest minority
group.6 1 That reader would also be surprised to learn just how
different the situations of the two groups are in some respects.
For instance, cohesion is lower among Hispanics than blacks, as
is shown by the way people identify themselves on the census
and by their rates of intermarriage.62 Whites also respond quite
differently to the two groups, and are much more willing to
tolerate Mexican American neighbors, which in turn means that
there is much less residential segregation. Accordingly, arguments based on polarization or segregation may play out differently for Mexican Americans than for African Americans.
Some readers might also be surprised to know that there
actually have been some empirical studies about the scope and
effectiveness of affirmative action. These studies suggest that, on
the whole, the attention devoted by legal scholars to the issue is
somewhat disproportionate to its practical importance. Affirmative action seems to have caused a modest increase in the num-

61. Robert Pear, Population Growth Outstrips Earlier U.S. Census Estimates, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 1992, at Al.
62. See Peter Skerry, Not Much Cooking: Why the Voting Rights Act Is Not Empowering Mexican Americans, BROOKINGS REV., Summer 1993, at 42, 43 (noting that
50.6% of all Mexican Americans surveyed in the 1980 census identified themselves
as racially "white").
63. Id. (pointing to a study of 1980 census data which found that an influx of
Latinos into a residential area does not seem to precipitate an exodus of Anglos).
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ber of blacks employed in certain industries (less than one percent annually) but it has had relatively little effect on long-term
wages.'
On yet another point, a bit of empiricism might bring some
refreshing variety to our thought about racial issues. One of the
major arguments for affirmative action is that it is needed to
combat ongoing discrimination. ThQse on the left point to a rising tide of racism, making affirmative action increasingly urgent. Those on the right point to the illegality of intentional
racial discrimination in our society, eliminating (in their view)
any need for such strong medicine as affirmative action. There
are strong grounds for doubting both views.
First, as to the "rising tide," public opinion polls quite consistently show a decrease in overtly racist statements by white
respondents.6 5 Either whites are less racist, or they think that
expressions of racism are less socially acceptable, even to other
whites. Notably, similar trends appear when researchers try to
gauge discriminatory conduct, rather than attitudes, through the
use of "testers."6 6 Interestingly, even if the tide of racism is rising, affirmative action may be as much a cause as a cure. In a
carefully researched study, two political scientists, Paul
Sniderman and Thomas Piazza, recently concluded that opposition to affirmative action spilled over into generally negative
attitudes toward blacks.67 To determine the direction of causation, Sniderman and Piazza randomly asked one group of whites
about affirmative action before asking questions designed to
reveal their appraisals of blacks. These respondents were significantly more negative toward blacks than were members of a

64. For a summary of the literature, see George Rutherglen, After Affirmative Action: Conditions and Consequences of Ending Preferences in Employment, 1992 U.
ILL. L. REv. 339, 346-52.
65. PAUL M. SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PAZZA, THE SCAR OF RACE 28, 40 (1993).
66. John J. Donohue, III & Peter Siegleman, The Changing Nature of Employment
DiscriminationLitigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1001-02 (1991). "Testers" are teams
of black and white persons who, for example, attempt to buy houses in certain
neighborhoods as part of a fair housing audit. Id. at 1001.
67. SNIDERMAN & PIAZZA, supra note 65, at 103.
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control group for whom the questions were asked in the opposite
order.6 8 So, reasons exist to doubt the left's conventional wisdom on this point.
The right's conventional wisdom, however, fares little better.
As Christopher Jencks points out, Chinese and Japanese Americans statistically have the educational traits, family backgrounds, and work attitudes that white employers value. 9 Yet
they are paid less than similarly situated whites." It is hard to
envision any cause of this disparity other than bias. If these
groups are handicapped in employment markets by bias, it is
difficult to argue that African Americans suffer no such disability.7 ' On the level of attitudes, Sniderman and Piazza found a
dismaying residuum of good, old-fashioned racism.
I am not claiming that this empirical data is unimpeachable,
or that if true, it would be decisive (in either direction) about the
desirability of affirmative action. Nevertheless, legal scholarship
with a more empirical bent would have a greater potential for
saying something new and valuable, rather than polishing a
high gloss on old cliches. As it is, much of the scholarship discussing affirmative action seems, like the judicial opinions discussed earlier, to have lost sight of its purposes. It lacks the
power to provide illumination or to persuade the uncommitted
reader. Rather, like some of Justice Scalia's opinions, much of
this scholarship seems mostly designed to preach to the converted.
The prospects for creative legal scholarship on race diminish
further under the pressures that inhibit unconventional thinking. The effort to dissuade Randall Kennedy from publishing a
critique of Critical Race Theory, for example, illustrates the
pressure against free discussion of racial issues." Other exam-

68. Id. at 102-04.
69. CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY 39 (1992).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 39-40. Because black women with college degrees earn roughly the same
salaries as white women, Jencks suggests that gender is more important than race
in determining the wages of women workers. Id. at 40.
72. SNIDERMAN & PIAZZA, supra note 65, at 38-51.
73. See Scott Brewer, Introduction: Choosing Sides in the Racial Critiques Debate,
103 HARv. L. REV. 1844, 1845-47 (1990).
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ples include the shabby treatment directed toward Lani Guinier.
Her innovative writings on voting rights displeased both conservatives and the civil rights establishment, leading President
Clinton to withdraw her nomination as Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. 4
I wish these problems were limited to the area of race law.
Considering how central racial issues are in our society, such a
limitation would be depressing enough. Yet we have recently
seen similar developments in another area-the debate over
pornography-where debate has often been more ideological
than substantive. One current controversy relates to Regina v.
5 in which the Canadian Supreme Court recently reinButler,"
terpreted its obscenity statute to treat pornography as a violation of the civil rights of women. Catharine MacKinnon, who pioneered this analysis of pornography, applauded the decision as a
breakthrough.76 Critics, notably Nadine Strossen of the ACLU,
gleefully reported that the Canadian authorities had applied the
decision to suppress lesbian and gay materials, serious art
works, and even the works of feminists such as MacKinnon's
colleague Andrea Dworkin." In a less publicized rebuttal, supporters have argued that these actions did not, for various reasons, really involve the Butler decision.7" Most of the discussion
on both sides of this issue has been somewhat superficial. For
example, neither side has discussed the strong resemblance
between Butler and certain aspects of the governing Miller standard7" in the United States." Thus, as with race scholarship,
the debate has been unduly abstract and ideological.
74. See Neal A. Lewis, Clinton Abandons His Nominee for Rights Post Amid Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1993, at Al.
75. 1 S.C.R. 452 (Can. 1992).
76. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDs (1993).
77. Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique of "The" Feminist Critique of Pornography, 79 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1145-47 (1993).
78. Michele Landsberg, Supreme Court Porn Ruling is Ignored, TORONTO STAR,
Dec. 14, 1993, at Dl. One exception was apparently a successful prosecution in Toronto against a small gay and lesbian bookstore selling sadomasochistic materials.
Id.
79. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (stating the Supreme Court's standard for obscenity).
80. Daniel 0. Conkle, Harm, Morality, and Feminist Religion: Canoda's New-But
Not So New-Approach to Obscenity, 10 CONST. COMMENTARY 105 (1993).
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As with race scholarship, the prospects for future intellectual
debate about pornography are unpromising. MacKinnon's characterization of her critics is, to say the least, uncharitable: "I do
not allow myself to be used to orchestrate and legitimate a socalled 'debate within feminism' over whether pornography harms
women. It is my analysis that that is the pimps' current strategy
for legitimizing a slave trade in women.""' This rhetoric seems
unconducive to fruitful discussion-as is some of the rhetoric of
her critics. In a shrill attack on her most recent book,82 Carlin
Romano begins by hypothesizing a decision on his part to rape
MacKinnon, which becomes transmuted into a decision merely to
write about this idea, for which he is then prosecuted. 3 Under
MacKinnon's theory, he says, writing about rape is indistinguishable from rape; his hypothetical is intended to make that
idea seem absurd.8 4 MacKinnon was understandably outraged
by Romano's fantasy of her as a crime victim. In response, she
has called the review "a public rape," perhaps confirming his
rendition of her substantive views, while her partner Jeffrey
Masson spoke darkly of ruining Romano's career.8 ' This
spectacle does not augur well for further public discourse on the
pornography issue. To return to my earlier athletic metaphor,
the players seem intent on brutalizing each other rather than
engaging in what sportswriters call "playing with intelligence."
The evidence here suggests (but falls well short of proving)
that the discourse on important issues of public policy too often
has been intellectually thin and is now threatening to break
down into ad hominem attacks.8 6 I have also offered nothing

81. David Margolick, Catering to an Academic Superstar, Judges Find Themselves
Tangled in a Free-Speech Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1993, at B12; see also Dan
Greenberg & Thomas H. Tobiason, The New Legal Puritanism of Catharine
MacKinnon, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1375, 1420-22 (1993) (criticizing the methods used by
MacKinnon to attack her critics).
82. See MACKINNON, supra note 76.
83. See Carlin Romano, Between the Motion and the Act, 257 NATION 563 (1993).
84. See id.
85. See Richard Lacayo, Assault by Paragraph: Catharine MacKinnon, Feminist
Legal Scholar and Antiporn Activist, Says She Was Raped by a Book Review, TIME,
Jan. 17, 1994, at 62.
86. See, e.g., Gary Peller, The Discourse of Constitutional Degradation, 81 GEO.
L.J. 313, 331 (1992) (responding to Mark Tushnet's criticism of legal storytelling by
asserting that "even within his own grid of meaning, Tushnet should be understood
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approaching proof that most law review writing is dull and inert. For readers who have lingering doubts about my conclusions, all I can suggest is to spend a few hours perusing the
recent issues of some leading reviews.
III. RENEWING THE PLAY OF INTELLIGENCE
Before discussing my diagnosis, let me briefly recapitulate the
symptoms. The upshot is that both law review articles and judicial opinions are getting increasingly longer and more complex,
yet seem to have less to say to much of their audiences. One
increasingly has the sense that writers are absorbed in verbal
manipulation rather than engaging genuine problems in the real
world. As we have seen, debates among scholars seem to be
getting uglier (and in fact, the level of civility on the Supreme
Court is not what it could be either). If this Essay has failed to
convince the reader of its full criticism on these points, I hope it
at least demonstrates that cause exists for concern. The more
difficult task, however, is articulating the cause of these symptoms.
In thinking about this question, I was initially reminded of
Justice Holmes' admonition that we should "think things, not
words."8 7 Part of the problem does seem to lie in that direction.
In reviewing the Court's work, we saw a fixation on verbal formulas; likewise, race scholarship frequently seems to suffer from
a similar fixation on stylized rhetoric. Yet Holmes' adage defines
the problem a bit too narrowly-suggesting that we mostly need
less abstraction and more concreteness. This deficiency actually
is part of the problem; we could surely benefit from more empirical research and sensitivity to concrete factual situations. Yet,
the problem goes beyond that.
The phrase that comes closest to identifying this missing
element is the "play of intelligence," a term I first heard used by

to lack integrity"); Mark Tushnet, Reply, 81 GEO. L.J. 343, 349-50 (1992) (retorting
that criticisms like Peller's are to be expected from "people . . . who know (at some
level) that their contributions as scholars . . . are not as substantial as they believe
(or fantasize) them to have been").
87. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L.
REv. 443, 460 (1899).
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my late colleague Irving Younger.8" Professor Younger defined
this phrase in an article about effective legal writing:
Good legal writing comes from the head. You must see
through and around your subject, measuring it by more than
one measuring stick, turning it over, testing it, arriving at a
just and clear-headed assessment of its position in the hierarchy of things.
The word that best expresses this requisite distance is
"detachment," understood as a certain amusement with the
enterprise upon which you are engaged, a sense of humor
about yourself and your works. If a lawyer has it, the
lawyer's writing will unfailingly communicate the play of
intelligence ("play" here being as important as "intelligence").
It is the play of intelligence that brings legal writing to life,
holding a reader's attention and eliciting his assent.8 9
To correct what might otherwise be a natural misconception, I
do not read Younger to be saying that the writer should feel
passionless or disinterested regarding a project. On the contrary,
great lawyers care deeply about the success of their arguments.
Also, writing is not always as enjoyable as he makes it
sound-as with athletics or ballet, much painful exertion goes
into what appears an effortless performance.
Despite these quibbles, this passage does help illuminate
some of the common shortfalls in current legal discourse. A
careful reading of the Supreme Court opinions discussed earlier
does not suggest that their authors "[saw] through and around
[their] subject ... turning it over [and assessing] its position in
the hierarchy of things." ° Rather the Justices seem to have
moved along the line of least resistance to crank out an opinion.
Similarly, much scholarly writing fails to demonstrate the de-

88. Irving Younger used this phrase in the course of criticizing a law review article. For readers who may be unfamiliar with him, perhaps I should explain that
Irving was not a conventional legal scholar, but rather thought of himself as a humanist, a scholarly attorney, and in his capacity as a trial lawyer, as an "artist in

the courtroom."
89. Irving Younger, Let's Get Serious, A.B.A. J., May 1, 1987, at 110. For some
strikingly similar observations from a Harvard psychiatrist about the role of playfulness and humor in creativity, see GEORGE E. VALLIANT, THE WISDOM OF THE EGO
226-27, 263-64 (1993).
90. Younger, supra note 89, at 110.
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tachment needed to question and thereby transcend the author's
preconceptions. Rather, scholars too often seem content to embellish on a familiar creed. Moreover, humor is in notoriously
short supply among both judges and legal scholars.
Notably, the passage quoted above was not written by a philosopher or literary theorist but by a working lawyer meditating
on his craft. Notice that Younger is not speaking about writing
in general but about legal writing. In doing so, he evokes the
traditional concept of the lawyer as professional. In a recent
book, Anthony Kronman provided a philosophical elaboration of
this concept." He stresses two of the same elements of professionalism as Younger-namely, good judgment, in the sense of
experienced practical reason, and detachment, in the sense that
the lawyer's identification with the client's needs is tempered by
the lawyer's obligations as a member of a learned profession.92
In addition, Kronman emphasizes another element that is implicit in Younger's formulation-imagination." Imagination is
needed in legal writing for several reasons: to generate potential
arguments for the client's position, to conjure up the likely
counterarguments of an opponent, and to gauge the likely reaction of the audience to both sets of arguments.
For these purposes, legal writing is distinguished from other
writing less by its subject matter than by its social context-the
author's relationship to the other participants in this rhetorical
situation. First, lawyers' writing is always conducted in the
shadow of an opponent. 4 Accordingly, the author must always
fear that any omissions, misrepresentations, or analytical weaknesses will be exploited. Yet the opponent is not truly an enemy,
because both the author and the opponent share allegiance to a
set of legal institutions and professional norms such as civility.
Second, legal writing is addressed to a particular kind of audi-

91. ANTHONY T. KROImAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (1993).
92. Id. at 130-34.
93. See id. at 69-70, 112-14, 149, 326-30, 341. Some additional insights about
imagination can be found in JOHN DEWEY, ART AS EXPERIENCE 267, 269 (1934).
94. This is most obviously so in litigation, but also even in transactional work,
where the opponent (another negotiating party, or often a government agency) provides a virtual counterpoint to the client's position.
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ence. Even where the client is the direct audience, the question
usually concerns the position some outside decisionmal.er might
ultimately take on an issue. A tribunal is always present as the
virtual if not actual audience. That tribunal does not come to the
argument without preconceptions but is presumed to be open to
argument from both sides. In short, we are positing a certain
kind of disinterested and critical audience. This audience,
whether virtual or actual, is reading with a purpose-not for
enjoyment or personal enlightenment, but to make a specific
decision or to analyze a particular problem. For this audience,
and this kind of writing, the "play of intelligence" is crucial.
Some examples are appropriate lest this attribute be thought
mythical. Both of my examples are lower court judges, in part to
avoid making invidious comparisons among the Justices.9 5 The
first example is Judge Learned Hand, the very paradigm of
judicial craftsmanship. Despite the calm, self-assured tone of his
opinions, Hand was plagued with agonizing doubts about the
analysis in many cases.9" He paused frequently between paragraphs to obtain a critique from his law clerk, which he took
very seriously indeed.9 7 He also displayed a sense of humor in
his memoranda to other judges and his dealings with his clerks,
to whom he was apparently prone to sing Gilbert and
Sullivan.9 8
My other example is contemporary and perhaps more surprising. At the time of his appointment, it would have been reasonable to view Judge Posner as a prolific scholar but indelibly
wedded to a narrow intellectual and political perspective. Indeed, I suspect that he retains that public image today. But
since being on the bench, he has shown a remarkable degree of
growth, both in his scholarship and in his judicial opinions. This
allegedly conservative scholar, for example, has endorsed legal
recognition of homosexual partnerships and constitutional pro-

95. In particular, I am fighting the strong temptation to use Justice Stevens as a
positive example; the reader would be entitled to regard this view by a former law
clerk as suspect.
96. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 286 (1994).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 410.
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tection for reproductive rights. 9 As to his writing on the bench,
consider the passage from the LSD case quoted earlier.' 0 More
recently, Posner wrote an exceptionally liberal opinion in an
entrapment case to which I suspect Justice Brennan would have
been happy to sign his name." 1 Presidents Reagan and Bush
apparently found Posner too unconventional and unpredictable
for a Supreme Court appointment, perhaps because they suspected he might be guilty of the play of intelligence.
As the last statement suggests, some degree of bias against
playful intelligence may exist in the judicial selection process.'0 2 Humor and imagination seem likely only to hurt one's
case before the Senate Judiciary Committee in the unlikely
event that those traits were not fatal earlier in the process. A
less grimly inquisitorial process of confirmation might provide
more creative intelligence on the bench. No profession, however,
can afford to rely on sheer talent for good performance. We have
to think about how we can raise the standard of performance
without relying on extraordinary talent.
Improving judicial and scholarly writing requires a greater
consciousness of the author's rhetorical situation. Good legal
writing exhibits the play of intelligence because lawyers badly
want to succeed and are keenly aware that the situation demands a certain kind of performance. Much of the current problem is that both judges and legal scholars have lost sight of the
rhetorical context in which they operate. Their situation is not
literally the same as the practicing lawyers, but there are some
intriguing analogies.
Consider first the judge. A key weakness of current Supreme
Court opinions seems to be that judges have sometimes lost
track of whom they are addressing or what they are trying to
accomplish. Of course, they have no literal.clients, but they seek
to advance a set of values and perspectives that might serve as
the basis for identifying metaphorical clients. For a judge like
Learned Hand, the client might be considered to be the Ameri-

99.
100.
101.
102.

RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 309-14, 339-41 (1992).
See supra text accompanying note 36.
See United States v. Hollingsworth, 9 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1993).
Query whether these traits would be assets in the faculty selection process.
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can legal system as an ongoing enterprise. The purpose, then, is
to help the system work as well as possible according to its own
norms and goals. I suspect, if they thought about it, a Kennedy
or Souter would identify similar clients. For a Brennan or a
Scalia, the client is an ideological position-it is only stretching
things a little to say that Brennan's client was the ACLU or
Scalia's the Federalist Society, not as specific organizations, but
as embodiments of a viewpoint. In similar terms, Justices Kennedy and Souter's clients might be described as the collectivity
of lower court judges.
The next step is to determine what a particular piece of writing is designed to do on behalf of the client. Often, the purpose
is to guide other courts to advance the client's interests in their
own decisions. In this respect, the important part of the opinion
is that portion speaking to future cases-though as we have
seen, judges sometimes fail to focus their energies there. Additionally, the opinion, if it is to elicit more than the most grudging obedience, must appeal to the values and goals of those
judges as well as to the author's. Sometimes, the purpose is to
persuade other Justices; this purpose is unlikely to be served by
hyperbolic rhetoric or by verbal abuse of other members of the
bench, though some Justices act on occasion as if they thought
otherwise. Whatever the purpose, we ought to expect the same
kind of professionalism from the judge that we expect from advocates such as the Solicitor General.
Although it may seem, if anything, less conventional to think
of scholars as having clients, the same analysis is also helpful. I
believe, and have argued elsewhere, that the scholar's client
should be truth with a small "t," though I cheerfully admit my
inability to define that term.103 More concretely, my view
makes the scholar's client the community of scholars considered
as a whole.
There are other conceptions of scholarship extant, and they
are unlikely to disappear. Some scholars, like Professor
MacKinnon, speak on behalf of abused women. Other scholars
may represent the Federalist Society, or African Americans, or

103. See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An
Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 832-33 (1993).
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some other group. Many of these clients are not unitary, and
their lawyers need to keep in mind that sharp disagreement
exists within these groups about their own values and interests.
Legal scholars should recognize that other lawyers seeking to
represent the same group legitimately may view a client's interests differently than they do. If legal scholars do choose to think
of themselves as representing some of these metaphorical clients, they should, like other lawyers, openly identify their clients. Like other lawyers, they continue to be bound by duties of
honesty and civility in dealing with their opponents and with
their audiences. When they engage in legal writing in the sense
that I have defined it, even the most ideological scholars are
fully in need of the detachment, imagination, and sense of judgment I have called the play of intelligence.
In the end, we can only expect the play of intelligence to flourish if we practice it ourselves and encourage others to do so.
Those of us in the academy can cultivate it in our colleagues
through our responses to their work. Possibly we can even give
judges a small nudge in that direction. Perhaps more importantly, in the long run, we can try to cultivate it in our students.'
Imagination, detachment, and humor are not easy things to
teach. But we can try.

104. Professor Kronman suggests that, properly employed, the Socratic method can
serve "as an instrument for the development of moral imagination." KRONMAN, supra
note 91, at 113. Improperly employed, however, it can have the opposite effect, as
many law students have cause to regret.

